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The Milogevie Trial: Lessons for the Conduct of Complex International
Criminal Proceedings. By Gideon Boas. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007. Pp. xviii, 306. Price: $45.00 (Paperback).
Reviewed by Tom Dannenbaum.
The arrest of Slobodan Milogevi6 in April 2001-and his subsequent
transfer to The Hague two months later-marked a critical juncture for the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). As the first
attempt to prosecute a former head of state for war crimes and genocide, and
with the other top targets Radovan Karad~i6 and Ratko Mladi6 still at large,
the Milogevi6 trial offered the Tribunal an opportunity to assert its relevance,
authority, and competence to a skeptical global audience.
Four years, twenty-seven days, seven thousand allegations of
wrongdoing, and over a million pages of disclosed prosecutorial
documentation later, Slobodan Milogevi6 was found dead in his jail cell, yet to
be convicted of a single crime. The early contender for "trial of the century"
ended in embarrassing anticlimax, without a defendant against whom to
deliver judgment.
In The Milogevik Trial, Gideon Boas, former Senior Legal Officer for
the Trial Chamber of the ICTY, picks over the bones of the prematurely
interrupted case, offering his candid assessment of its successes and failures,
and drawing lessons for similar prosecutions in the future. Boas argues that
the criteria against which such trials must be evaluated are the twin procedural
virtues of fairness and expeditiousness. While the Milogevi6 trial just about
met minimum standards of fairness, he contends, it far exceeded the length
and scope of reasonable expeditiousness. With better application of the rules
of international criminal procedure by both the court and the prosecution,
Boas believes that Milogevi6 would have died a convicted criminal, leaving
behind not the unanswered question of what might have been, but a verdict to
bring succor to those whom he made suffer, and a precedent to strike fear into
others seeking to enforce brutality on civilian populations.
Boas exploits his intimate familiarity with the Milogevi6 case to offer a
thorough and illuminating discussion of the legal and strategic dilemmas that
faced the prosecution and the court from start to finish. Of Boas's broad
arguments, two in particular point to important considerations for the future
conduct of similar proceedings.
First, Boas criticizes the Tribunal's permissiveness in allowing the
prosecution to "throw the book" at Milogevi6, charging him with every crime
to which he could possibly be tied. The result was an impenetrable sea of
paperwork, a trial in which eighty percent of the offenses examined were not
the direct personal responsibility of the defendant, and acquittals on more than
a thousand charges before Milogevi6 even began his defense.
Boas urges future prosecutors to choose a narrowly focused and
representative case that succeeds in exposing the depth of the accused's
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wrongdoing and facilitates the expeditious delivery of justice, without going
to unnecessary lengths to prove the breadth and repetition of wrongdoing.
However, recognizing that this advice will often be ignored, he articulates a
theory of judicial case management under which courts can compel such
narrow tailoring in the face of stubborn prosecutorial ambition. In this vein, he
commends the Trial Chamber's decision to utilize macromanagement tools in
Milogevi6's trial, such as setting overall time limits for the presentation of
each party's case. However, he argues that, where such methods are
insufficient to narrow the case (as they were in the Milogevi6 trial),
procedurally available micromanagement tools, such as directly limiting the
charges brought and the classes of witnesses that may be called, should be
used to ensure a fair and expeditious trial.
In his second important line of argument, Boas addresses the trend
among high-profile defendants in international criminal proceedings to
represent themselves. While recognizing (somewhat ruefully) that the right to
self-representation has become established in international criminal law, he
argues that recent international criminal jurisprudence has interpreted it to be
a limited right that can be regulated when it threatens the fairness or
expeditiousness of a trial. While such regulation can occur through the
imposition of assigned counsel, intermediate options are also available to the
judge, and Boas is particularly sympathetic to the Milogevi6 court's
innovation of what he terms the "hybrid amicus/defence counsel" (p. 256)-
amicus curiae appointed by the court to serve in the interests of the defendant,
though not to replace the defendant in his function as his own counsel. Despite
the utility of this innovation, Boas argues that the Tribunal failed to take an
adequately firm and consistent position on regulating Milogevi6's right to self-
representation throughout the case, severely delaying the proceedings and
undermining their fairness.
From within a framework that prioritizes fairness and expeditiousness
above all else, Boas presents compelling arguments, and his analysis of how
to achieve those goals within the current procedural parameters of
international criminal law is instructive. However, it is precisely Boas's
dogmatic adherence to the exclusive criteria of fairness and expeditiousness
that is The Miloevi6 Trial's central weakness. In explicitly repudiating the
idea that courts must be flexible to adapt to the political context within which
they operate (pp. 265-68), he ignores the core failure of the Milogevi court,
and in so doing draws incomplete and dangerous lessons for the conduct of
similar prosecutions in the future.
After all, the primary failure of the trial was not legal, but political.
Within one week of the opening statements, Milogevi6's approval ratings in
Serbia, which had dropped into single digits, doubled to twenty percent,'
where they remained. Indeed, so powerful was Milogevi6's trial in mobilizing
support for his previously discredited ultranationalist agenda, that his Serbian
Radical Party pressured Serbian state television to broadcast the prosecution
1. Andrew Purvis, Star Power in Serbia, TIME, Sept. 30, 2002, at 46.
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2of Milogevi 's erstwhile henchman Vojislav Segelj in 2007. That Milogevi 's
political heirs are the leading Serbian voices advocating the broadcast of
ICTY proceedings against his collaborators is a disturbing reflection of the
impact of the Milogevi6 trial in the state where it matters most. Rather than
promoting reconciliation, the trial appears to have stoked the flames of
nationalism that originally facilitated the crimes against humanity for which
Milogevi6 was prosecuted.
By declaring such concerns political and therefore outside the remit of
prosecutorial or judicial consideration, Boas takes the rigidly legalist line of
"let justice be done, though the heavens may fall." But what kind of justice is
a fair and expeditious trial that catalyzes ethnic hatred and potentially
precipitates further violence? Did we try Milogevi6 for the countless innocents
who suffered his reign of terror, or for the international legalists who seek an
insulated code of international criminal procedure? The challenge of trying a
former political leader who committed crimes with the support of large
numbers of political followers is unique not, as Boas claims, simply because
the prosecutor's case is necessarily more complex than usual (p. 93), but
rather, because the conduct and outcome of the trial are likely to have
profound political consequences for a precariously balanced society trying to
heal from the trauma of mass atrocity. For prosecutors and judges to bury their
heads in the sand in an attempt to ignore these political ramifications is the
height of irresponsibility. Boas's exclusive focus on the virtues of fairness and
expeditiousness, with the idea that other values may be "legitimate derivative
outcomes" of a fair and expeditious process, but cannot be allowed to drive
decisionmaking (p. 4), is misguided.
Of course, this is not to say that fairness and expeditiousness are not
important. Quite the contrary. But an appreciation of political consequences
must not be discarded. Rather than focusing on the two-way balancing act
between fairness and expeditiousness, courts and prosecutors should focus on
a three-way balance among fairness, expeditiousness, and political
reasonableness.
As a practical matter, many of Boas's suggestions are politically
reasonable, and so the distinction appears unimportant. But the overlap is not
complete. On Boas's view, the imposition of assigned counsel and the
assignment of hybrid amicus/defense counsel were both acceptable responses
to Milogevi6's petition to represent himself. From the political perspective this
is not the case. Milogevi6 abused the platform provided by his status as
counsel to engage in inflammatory nationalist rhetoric directed not at the
bench, but at the Serbian masses. Far from blocking the propagandist use of
the courtroom, the hybrid amicus solution gave the accused a safety net that
ensured that his political posturing would not come at the cost of failing to
assert fundamental legal arguments in his defense. Given this man's proven
capacity to inspire atrocity, political reasonableness militated unequivocally in
favor of assigned counsel, an alternative that would have preserved the
fairness of the trial while eliminating the threat of Milogevi 's grandstanding.
2. Vesna Peric Zimonjic, Trial Opens of Serb "Who Gave Ethnic Cleansing to World,"
INDEP. (London), Nov. 8, 2007, at 32.
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Weighing political factors alongside the ends of fairness and
expeditiousness does not entail discarding those more conventional values.
The Milogevik Trial provides an excellent elaboration of the procedural
parameters within which prosecutorial and judicial decisions must be made,
and provides compelling analysis on the fairness and expeditiousness of
various options. Boas draws on a deep and expansive knowledge of
international criminal procedure, and for international criminal lawyers and
judges the book is a valuable resource. However, the argument is incomplete,
and the lessons potentially misleading. In deciding how to structure the
prosecution of a political leader for political crimes committed via political
means, one simply cannot ignore political consequences.
International Refugee Law and Socio-Economic Rights: Refuge from
Deprivation. By Michelle Foster. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2007. Pp. 355. Price: $98.50 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Rebecca
Heller.
The breadth and diversity of emerging claims to refugee status have
forced immigration tribunals in many countries to reassess traditional
interpretations of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.
Michelle Foster's book, International Refugee Law and Socio-Economic
Rights: Refuge from Deprivation, does not aim to redefine the Convention, but
rather examines how it might evolve to respond to emerging socioeconomic
issues in refugee law. Foster reviews the case law of common law courts, as
well as recent theoretical developments in human rights law, to build a
persuasive case for including socioeconomic claims in refugee status
determinations. However, she provides very little analysis of domestic policy
considerations, or of the interaction between immigration law jurisprudence
and legislative priorities.
Foster begins with the Refugee Convention itself. Rebutting critics'
charges that it is a Cold War relic, Foster argues it has shown an ability to
adapt, such as by allowing new categories of asylum claims-most notably,
gender-based persecution. Foster also identifies developments in international
human rights law that are eroding "[t]he simplistic distinction between
political persecution, which is traditionally thought to involve positive action
by an entity targeted at a particular individual or group, and economic
degradation, which has traditionally been thought to be uncontrollable,
inevitable, and just a sad fact of life" (p. 19).
This eroding distinction is relevant to asylum applicants as they attempt
to identify the source of their oppression and whether that oppression rises to
the level of "persecution." Foster argues for applying a human rights
framework to evaluating refugee claims, as it would provide a universal and
objective set of standards that would enhance the consistency and
predictability of the asylum system. She notes that the Refugee Convention
was written against the backdrop of human rights law, as "[t]he key purpose
of the Refugee Convention was not so much to define what constitutes a
Recent Publications
refugee, but to provide for the rights and entitlements that follow from such
recognition" (p. 46).
Foster makes a convincing case for applying human rights standards to
persecution claims, but never adequately deals with possible policy
objections. She acknowledges that critics might argue that allowing human
rights-based claims could open the "floodgates" of asylum-seekers, but she
dismisses this as "not a valid legal argument" and "inchoate" (p. 79). She
returns to the issue in her conclusion, arguing that other requirements of the
Refugee Convention would check against this concern, but only after having
argued for the systematic relaxation of these requirements for the last 340
pages. She also claims that even if the grounds for qualification were
expanded, not everyone who qualified would leave their home country. This
seems implausible given current rates of migration. In the end, she rests on her
earlier claim that "[t]he difficulty with the floodgates argument is that it is
clearly not a legal argument, as has been reiterated by many senior common
law courts" (p. 344). While this may be true, it does not mean that policy
considerations are not taken into account in determining the grounds for
granting asylum. Immigration judges apply the Convention in part as
interpreted by legislative and administrative bodies. It is typically these
political branches of government that incorporate Convention grounds into
national laws and regulations according to domestic policy priorities.
After describing the rights-based approach to determining asylum
claims, Foster turns to explaining how economic claims might fit under the
definition of persecution in the Refugee Convention. Persecution is typically a
matter of degree: the relevant inquiry is whether a particular form of
oppression or discrimination rises to the level of "persecution." Foster
demonstrates how the interaction of economic discrimination with other
harms may rise to the level of persecution; examples include deprivation of
the right to work and to receive primary education and healthcare. An
accumulation of smaller violations may also amount to persecution, but as
noted above, most courts are more likely to view the abrogation of civil and
political rights as constituting oppression, as opposed to the abuse of social
and economic rights. Foster views this as an overly rigid approach that
mistakenly compartmentalizes rights, when in fact, social and economic rights
violations often implicate civil and political rights. This can be seen in the
significant overlap between the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), for example.
Rejecting the hierarchical model of rights, Foster argues that the key
question in determining whether persecution has occurred should be whether
the core of a certain right has been violated. Emerging theories of human
rights have identified both core and peripheral elements of certain rights, and
in practice most international refugee courts make status determinations based
on the degree of persecution. Foster does not offer a precise explanation for
how the "core" of a particular right might be determined, nor does she address
whether "core violations" of all rights-or only violations of certain more
fundamental rights-would constitute persecution. In the end, it is unclear
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whether the idea of the "core" of a right in the refugee context would serve as
more than a metaphor for a "serious human rights violation," because there is
no real analysis of how this would shift the existing framework of asylum
jurisprudence. Indeed, Foster acknowledges that this conceptualization will
shift on a case-by-case basis "according to the particular vulnerabilities of the
applicant" (p. 212).
In addition to establishing persecution as a prerequisite for an asylum
grant, the Refugee Convention requires both that the applicant fit into one of
the five protected groups (based on race, nationality, religion, political
opinion, or social status) and that there be a causal "nexus" between the
claimant's group membership and the persecution suffered. Foster deals first
with the nexus clause, noting a traditional bias against applicants from poor
countries, whom judges occasionally write off as simply looking for a better
life, rather than actually having suffered persecution: "The corollary is that
decision-makers often appear more comfortable with an applicant from a poor
country when he or she can establish some independent wealth" (p. 239). She
identifies two distinct tests for the nexus requirement-a "but-for" approach,
which requires demonstration that an applicant would not have been
persecuted but for his or her membership in a protected group, and the
"predicament approach," by which "the fact that one group is significantly
over-represented amongst victims is deemed sufficient to establish nexus" (p.
281). The "but-for" test often imposes a higher burden on applicants from
poorer countries, where economic oppression may be more widespread. In the
case of large-scale societal inequality, it is difficult for an impoverished
applicant to claim that absent one particular kind of persecution, life would
have been substantively better. The predicament approach mitigates the
question of intent; persecution does not have to be deliberate if there is
widespread societal discrimination, neglect, or government unwillingness to
prevent rights violations. However, a predicament approach that recognizes
poverty as giving rise to a protected social group would necessarily lead to an
exponential increase in the number of people eligible for asylum. Foster does
not attempt to analyze the potential policy implications of such a definitional
shift.
Finally, Foster addresses under which of the five protected groups an
economic or social claim might fit. The most obvious, she believes, is the
social group. Economic status may be used as the basis for social group status,
with the most obvious example being caste membership, which meets the
requirement of immutability (p. 304). Less obvious examples where judges
have granted social group status based (at least partially) on an economic
claim include "poor campesinos (rural peasant farmers) from El Salvador" and
"impoverished young women from the former Soviet Union recruited for
exploitation in the international sex trade" (p. 306). A social group claim may
also include membership in a class-based organization, such as a union or
cooperative, or membership in a traditionally economically disenfranchised
class of people, such as people with disabilities, women, or children. Foster
makes a convincing argument against those who claim that poor people
should not be considered a social group because poverty is not immutable.
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How, after all, does one voluntarily disassociate from being poor? However,
she follows this discussion with a variety of statistics illustrating the
devastating and widespread effects of poverty, which could lend support to the
floodgates concern.
Thus, the major hole in Foster's argument is that policy and practical
considerations are not taken into account in her analysis. She makes a strong
case for what refugee law should be, but overlooks political constraints that
limit what it could be. She states that she is not arguing for a large expansion
of grounds for asylum, but this is difficult to accept given her vision of how
the Refugee Convention should be interpreted. In the end, Foster makes a
strong and convincing argument that in a world where law and ethics exist
outside of foreign policy considerations, the Refugee Convention clearly
allows for broader inclusion of socioeconomic claims in the determination of
refugee status. Whether this analysis applies to the world in which we live
may be a question for another book.
Judges Beyond Politics in Democracy and Dictatorship: Lessons from Chile.
By Lisa Hilbink. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Pp.
xvi, 299. Price: $80.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Kathleen Claussen.
Lisa Hilbink catches readers of her latest book by surprise when she
asserts that "it is neither possible nor desirable to construct a judiciary beyond
politics" (p. 8). In Judges Beyond Politics in Democracy and Dictatorship:
Lessons from Chile, Hilbink sets out to explain why Chilean judges failed to
challenge the illiberal and undemocratic policies advanced by the military
dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet. Hilbink, a political scientist, enriches the
sparse literature in this area of scholarship with her meticulously researched
work. Judges sheds light on a variety of critical questions at the intersection of
democratic theory, law, and political science; it disappoints only insofar as it
fails to probe deeper into these questions and unpack the normative
dimensions of the trend it identifies.
The book opens with a literature review in which Hilbink describes the
increased importance of judges in judiciaries around the world throughout the
1970s and 1980s. She traces a turn to the judiciary, widely acknowledged in
political science literature, as part of a broader democratization process in
which the polity looked to judges to be guarantors of civil and social rights
newly affirmed in the democratic constitutions emerging at that time. She then
introduces the anomaly of Chile, where judges of the Chilean Supreme Court
under the Pinochet dictatorship did not engage with the law in this way.
Hilbink turns to the question: "under what conditions are judges likely to be
willing and able to play [a role in discussion and reflection about the meaning
of democracy]" (p. 23)? Although tangential to her own study of Chile, this
background inquiry situates the Chilean case and gives rise to important
theoretical questions, to which Hilbink returns in her conclusion.
Unfortunately, however, the first chapter's exploration of major normative
shifts in transitional governments is not taken up in a formal way in Hilbink's
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analysis. Rather, the book delves into the empirical study the author
conducted using case law from the time of the dictatorship and personal
interviews with current and former judges.
The trend Hilbink observes, that the Chilean Supreme Court
overwhelmingly supported the position of the Pinochet dictatorship, is not
novel, though the clarity and comprehensiveness of her research is impressive.
Her discussion of the judges' seeming complicity leads her to conclude that
the institutional structure and ideology of the Chilean judiciary promoted a
"conservative bias" among the judges (institutional "apoliticism") (p. 39).
"Structure" refers to "the organizational rules governing the powers and duties
of different offices," while "ideology" refers to the "discrete and relatively
coherent set of ideas shared by members of the institution regarding the
institution's social function or role" (p. 5). In her analysis of ideology, Hilbink
implicitly deploys an argument predicated on the dual quality of norms, such
that the norms of the profession are both embodied in and reproduced by the
institutional structure. Judges complements the work of other scholars who
have also pointed to the configuration of the Chilean judiciary-its limited
judicial independence and its corporatist arrangement with other branches of
government-as serving to constrain liberal judicial review. In contrast to the
work of other scholars, however, Hilbink argues that there was a more
substantive underlying ideology at work. According to Hilbink, the
apoliticism of the judiciary served to perpetuate a conservative bias,
understood by those within the system to be the prototype of professionalism,
while support for any other view was considered "political" or unprofessional.
Hilbink gives fairly short shrift to alternative explanations for trends of
judicial behavior in illiberal contexts. In a few short pages, she glosses over
potential reasons for the trend she has identified in Chile, inter alia social
class, legal philosophy, and judges' personal policy considerations, though she
returns to these possible alternative explanations methodically in later
chapters as part of her data analysis. While she concedes that each of these
features might contribute in some way to judicial complicity, Hilbink argues
that, even taken together, they are not sufficient. At the same time, Hilbink
leaves out any meaningful consideration of the most salient alternative
explanation: fear of the powerful Pinochet regime. In 1991, newly inaugurated
President Patricio Aylwin attributed the lack of judicial challenge to a lack of
moral courage. Yet, would a voice against the violence of the dictatorship
have made a difference? By speaking out, judges risked endangering their
lives. Paralyzed by a fear for their safety, these jurists might have felt it
necessary to rubber-stamp dictatorial policies in order to protect their families.
The book instead argues that judicial deference to the military dictatorship
was actually the product of broader ideological and structural features.
Despite Hilbink's detailed description of these characteristics of the
judiciary and her impressive command of the intricacies of the Chilean legal
system, civil law scholars may criticize her rejection of an otherwise natural
observation that in the civil law system, legal formalism dominates the
landscape of judicial decisionmaking. In this way, the book dismisses a fairly
simple explanation for the behavior it analyzes-that the judicial record may
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actually be attributed to the general framework of the civil law tradition.
Indeed, half of Hilbink's argument is premised on structural characteristics
specific to Chile but not grossly unlike other civil law judiciaries. Moreover,
her broad thesis appears to extend to all judges, but, in a single sentence, it
merely mentions the work of the Constitutional Tribunal which did, in fact,
hand down decisions against the dictatorship.
Hilbink's framing of the central questions of her study lends itself to a
sociological analysis as much as a legal or political one. If one makes
allegations about the socialization of the profession, situating those concepts
in a broader framework of civic engagement in Chile and cultural mores about
professionalism is critical. As Hilbink acknowledges, structure, cultural
assumptions, and judicial decisionmaking are inextricably linked: The
organizational structure "served to reproduce a very conservative
understanding of the judicial role, or what I am calling the institutional
ideology. The core of this ideology was a belief that adjudication was and
should remain strictly apolitical" (p. 93). To term this socialization of the
judicial process an "ideology" may be overstating the case; other authors
identifying the same trends have used terms such as "legal culture" or
"socialization."
In short, Hilbink's bright-line conclusion may not be as groundbreaking
as it is made out to be. The risk-averse behavior of Chilean judges should not
be surprising in light of their circumstances and their institutional and
professional constraints. Similarly, the book's lack of comparative standards
or benchmarks against which to evaluate statistics such as the percentage of
habeas petitions granted by the Supreme Court or the success rate of other
constitutional claims makes it difficult to understand whether the Chilean case
is in fact an anomaly, as Hilbink argues, or whether similar patterns would be
found in other like circumstances. In the final chapter, Hilbink attempts to
bolster her argument with examples from other countries (Spain, Italy, and
South Africa) that have experienced similar trends, though the comparisons
are not carried out in enough detail to allow for cross evaluation.
A perception of the role of the judiciary is deeply rooted in any given
society, reflective of its sociopolitical history. In the United States and around
the world, with the rise of constitutionalism, citizens have developed an
expectation for representativeness within the judiciary, under the assumption
that judicial decisions should reflect shared social mores. Undoubtedly, the
structure of the Chilean judiciary lends itself to a particular philosophy and
judicial culture. The historical waves of a strong democracy usurped by a
devastating dictatorship followed by yet another transformation contribute
additional layers to the story. According to Hilbink, Chilean judges betrayed
their public by abandoning their oath to uphold a constitution imbued with
liberal democratic rights and by displaying "a greater commitment to public
order than to individual citizen rights" (p. 70). Here again, Hilbink conflates
the relevant ideologies. Democracy in many parts of Latin America at that
time largely granted deference to legislatures; the U.S. liberal rights-based
judicial ideology did not take hold in Latin America (and most of Europe)
until much later. Even after it had, judges in the "continental" tradition
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continued to serve as mouthpieces of the law, rather than affirmative
promoters or creators of the law, as Hilbink advocates they should. According
to Hilbink, rather than insulate themselves beyond politics, judges should
engage with the polity and other structures of government. Her book aims to
demonstrate the dangers of apoliticism such that "if we can understand the
sources of undesirable judicial behavior, we can, by inference, generate
hypotheses about the conditions that might allow for more positive outcomes
in other times and places" (p. 23).
Paradoxically, this book only skims the surface of a deeper debate while
attempting to assert generalizable conclusions. It gives the reader pause to ask
far-sweeping questions about the role of the judiciary and the many meanings
of judicial independence. Hilbink's study sheds important light on Thomas
Jefferson's maxim referencing the function of the judiciary: independence
from the king or executive is a good thing, but independence from the will of
the nation is a solecism.
Constitutionalizing Secession in Federalized States: A Procedural Approach.
By Miodrag Jovanovi6. Utrecht: Eleven International Publishing, 2007.
Pp. xix, 203. Price: E65 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Caroline Edsall.
In this book, Miodrag Jovanovi6, a law professor at the University of
Belgrade, provides a comprehensive and insightful study of secession
throughout history and across the world and proposes a constitutional
procedural framework that would permit groups to assert the right to self-
determination. JovanoviC's contribution to the literature lies in his defense of
the constitutionalization of secession and his thorough analysis of the legal
procedure that should be used to bring it about. Although Jovanovi6 skims
past some historical lessons and does not provide an answer to readers who
may be inclined to question the substantive merits of secessionist claims, his
procedural analysis is clear, well organized, convincing, and unique.
Toward the beginning of the book, Jovanovi6 lays out various
prerequisites that must be satisfied before his proposed procedure can be
successfully applied. First, Jovanovid's framework applies only to federal
states with electoral and liberal democracies that boast an independent
judiciary, have a significant opposition vote, and guarantee protection from
police terror. Next, the right to secession must be recognized in the
constitution, which would have the effect of limiting secession to the most
worthy cases, allowing governments to avoid impasse, preventing the
interference of international actors, and ensuring relative political stability by
legally regulating an otherwise explosive political issue. The foregoing
reasons constitute Jovanovid's "political prudence" argument, which he
claims is a new addition to the field in defense of the constitutionalization of
secession.
After establishing these prerequisites, Jovanovi6 presents his step-by-
step framework for secession. Jovanovi6 tackles one of the most difficult
questions first: who exercises the right and how? As a supporter of total
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democracy, he prefers constitutionally protected popular participation to elite-
level, closed-door negotiations. A direct referendum may seem the obvious
solution, but Jovanovi6 is careful to highlight the multiple problems of that
approach. For example, the masses often possess "less than perfect
knowledge" (p. 169), and referenda can be "'insensitive to the intensity and
graduated nature of opinion,' because different sides of the same argument are
'subsumed into a single one size fits all statement or choice"' (p. 170 internal
quotations omitted). Furthermore, the question of "'which constituency is to
decide on secession: the majority of separatist part, the whole, or concurrent
majorities of both constituencies' is a challenging one (p. 171). Jovanovi6
answers that referenda remain the preferable and legitimate approach since
they can "make more people better off, [but] not all people" (p. 182).
Regarding the constituency-definition problems, he argues in favor of
allowing the referendum vote to proceed at the territorial instead of the
national level so long as subsequent referenda are held to allow minorities
within the seceding territory to remain affiliated with the larger federal state if
they so desire.
Finally, Jovanovi6 does not shy away from treating the question of who
exactly should vote in the territorial referenda. The simple answer: all who are
eligible to vote in the territory's regular elections. However, international
standards support residency requirements which bar participation of interested
members of ethnocultural groups who no longer inhabit the land in question.
Jovanovid, although stopping short of rejecting outright this restriction, hints
that such individuals should be entitled to vote. The reader would appreciate a
more definitive response to this issue, but Jovanovid's nuanced treatment of
the manifold difficulties of defining the referendum is commendable.
Jovanovi6 then backtracks slightly to address the actors who can initiate
a secession process and propose the referendum, singling out local
legislatures, citizen groups, or central authorities as possibilities. He next
details guidelines according to which the secession campaign and referendum
must be conducted, including a campaign limited to forty-five to ninety days'
duration. During this period, Jovanovi6 would require that media coverage be
balanced and strict upper limits on the use of public funds set. The clarity of
the referendum question is of the utmost performance: there can only be one
issue at stake, it must be understandable to the average citizen, and it must be
published with an unbiased explanation. Once the votes are in, an independent
body must be established to ensure accuracy, along with an official gazette to
publish results, a tribunal to review the complaints of dissatisfied citizens, and
a special act of parliament to acknowledge and implement the outcome. If the
referendum has a negative result, there should be a mandatory waiting period
before any further referendums can be held.
In between his discussion of prerequisites and his presentation of a
procedural approach, Jovanovi6 embarks on a historical survey of past
secession attempts around the world. His accounts ultimately fail analytically.
While readers who know little about the reconstitution of the Swiss cantons or
the attempted secession of Western Australia may find these tales fascinating,
they also contain valuable lessons for would-be secessionists, which
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Jovanovi6 neglects to treat in full. For instance, in Australia, despite a clear
referendum vote in favor of secession in 1933, global crises sidetracked the
issue and within a decade, there was no more talk of fragmentation. If
secessionist sentiment can blow over so quickly, any procedural framework
for it should include a means by which to ensure that secession movements
are not simply the growing pains of maturing federal nations in a sometimes
economically turbulent world, but Jovanovi6 does not discuss or absorb this
lesson. He also includes a survey of current constitutional clauses on
secession: from Burma to St. Kitts, many nations have dealt with secession at
some point in their recent past, including the USSR, the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), Serbia and Montenegro, Ethiopia, and the
United Kingdom. Unfortunately, this section too contains little commentary
on the successes, failures, innovations, and shortcomings of these clauses,
leaving these important questions to the reader's speculation.
To his credit, Jovanovi6 gives fuller treatment to the history of the
Badinter Commission, providing insightful analysis along the way. Charged
with resolving the 1991 crisis in Yugoslavia, the Commission made a grave
mistake in applying the uti posseditis principle (calling for borders to be left
as found at the end of a war or decolonization movement) to state dissolution
in a permanent fashion. Thus the Badinter Commission wrote about
Yugoslavia, "'[w]hatever the circumstances, the right to self-determination
must not involve changes to existing frontiers at the time of independence
except where the states concerned agree otherwise"' (p. 96). Although
Jovanovi6 concedes its logic in cases of decolonization, he argues that this
principle should not be automatically applied to cases of secession. Jovanovid
calls the Badinter solution an "'invented' norm of public international law"
and points out that it would have grave consequences for federalism generally
by implying that federal nations are automatically less stable and therefore
less deserving of international recognition (p. 102). Although not entirely
against the uti posseditis principle, Jovanovi6 believes that it should only be
used as a temporary measure until the people have a chance to speak and the
politicians have a chance to negotiate, thereby redrawing borders to the
satisfaction of the greatest number of people.
Successes and failures of historical analysis aside, a more significant
critique arises from Jovanovi's failure to prescribe a substantive component
of secessionist claims. Jovanovid's procedural approach is what makes his
work unique, and the steps he lays out will serve any government attempting
to clarify secession procedure, be it constitutional or legislative. However,
many scholars have argued that the right to secede hinges upon ethnic, racial,
religious, linguistic, or cultural distinctness. Others, such as Lea Brilmayer,
point to territorial claims stemming from historical wrongs. Jovanovi6 rightly
identifies a "biased referee" problem (p. 38) when it comes to governments
themselves assessing the moral weight of substantive secessionist claims, but
discarding the substantive requirement altogether is a faulty and incomplete
solution. Jovanovi6 believes it is safe to rely entirely on constitutionalized
procedure, which, if followed, would permit all willing subunits to secede
from federalized states with ease. Not only is it unlikely that any state would
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consent to secession without merit, it is also probable that relative chaos
would result if groups with no legitimate claim to independence sought to
invoke a right to self-determination.
Although his piece suffers from occasional weaknesses in historical
analysis and a dismissal of the substantive components of secession,
Jovanovi6 focuses on federalism, constitutionalism, and procedure in a way
that few scholars of secession previously have, and in so doing makes a
substantial contribution to the field. As he writes in closing, the purpose of his
book is to clarify "certain basic concepts essential for a proper understanding
of this subject matter" and to "actively contribute to the ongoing theoretical
debate in this field," and to that extent, he is largely successful (p. 203).
The International Judge. By Daniel Terris, Cesare P.R. Romano, and Leigh
Swigart. Walham, Mass: Brandeis University Press, 2007. Pp. 315.
Price: $45.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Craig Konnoth.
In this charming work, the authors provide interesting insights into a
relatively new type of judicial body: international courts, whose jurisdictions
cross national boundaries. The authors' primary goal is to provide an
understanding of the courts from the perspective of their judges and court
officials. The authors aim to familiarize American critics with these courts.
Besides pointing to sovereignty concerns, critics argue that for the United
States to submit to the courts, their jurisprudence would need to be more
"settled" and less changeable and "political." Rather than fall back on the
usual, unhelpful reply, that the jurisprudence and authority of international
courts can only become "settled" if countries like the United States join up,
the authors seem to believe that their description of the courts will assuage
readers' fears and misconceptions.
Those looking for sustained and rigorous academic argument will be
disappointed by this book, which more often employs detailed and colorful
descriptions of the courts and portrayals of their judges. The authors make few
arguments. They do not, for example, cite the practice of a particular court as
a model for other courts, or as a reason for U.S. support for the courts overall.
Instead, they often spell out both sides of arguments, leaving the disputes in
the voices of judges and court officials rather than their own. Readers are left
to draw their own conclusions from the descriptions (or not).
The number and variety of courts and judges surveyed is the great
strength of this book. While the authors focus their research on certain courts
and are conscious of resultant shortcomings, the breadth is impressive; few
other studies assess as wide a variety of international courts. This broad
approach helps the authors achieve at least one of their purposes-to make
readers familiar (and comfortable) with these bodies. It also provides two
other advantages.
First, since no single international standard exists to judge the best
practices of any one court, the practices of one court can best be evaluated by
comparison with the practices of other international courts. Thus, we learn
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that at the International Court Justice (ICJ), each of the fifteen justices provide
a draft opinion which is then circulated to their colleagues, followed by
deliberations and a drafting of the full court opinion. The advantages
(thoroughness) and disadvantages (inefficiency and production of multiple
opinions) of this process are apparent when compared with processes in other
courts. Similarly, the comparative approach proves useful in assessing
dissenting practices, mutual citation, nominee selection, linguistic
backgrounds of judges surveyed, and canons of judicial conduct.
Second, this broad survey aids discussion of general trends across all
international courts, such as issues of translation and Anglicization of the
process and the building up of "precedent" (p. 118). It also allows the authors
to provide broad recommendations for the systems across the board, such as a
more formalized selection process and the establishment of uniform rules of
procedure. While it is of course true that different courts need different
analyses, the authors are sensitive to these differences and restrict their
recommendations appropriately.
The disadvantage of this survey approach is that it can become
monotonous. The authors rarely make explicit arguments, and when they do,
they are often buried by too much information, as the processes of the courts
are perfunctorily listed without comment. Sometimes the reader is left
questioning the point of all that detail, unsure what conclusions to draw. As
the authors aim to make readers familiar with the courts rather than to argue a
certain position, the information in some sections can feel unstructured and
directionless.
The monotony is exacerbated for readers already familiar with
international courts, as the book is written for nonexperts. While Chapter 1
opens with a useful basic introduction to these judicial bodies, providing a
brief history, taxonomy, and scope, the foundational approach permeates the
book. One sometimes finds basic information provided with little useful
commentary, such as the description of what constitutes substantive law, with
explanations of the sources of law, and the difference between appellate and
trial courts.
These flaws however, are generally eclipsed by the book's primary
charm: the interviews with numerous international judges. A profile and
interview of an international judge concludes every chapter except the first,
allowing judges to comment on their personal experiences, the tribunals on
which they have worked, and the system as a whole. These generally amount
to sympathetic and reassuring depictions of the international judiciary.
Court officials' comments pepper the rest of the book. Chapter 3 for
example, offers the judges' perspectives on the practices of their courts, the
backgrounds of their colleagues, the quality of the lawyers, and linguistic
challenges. In Chapter 5, judges discuss American attitudes to the system, the
importance of local tribunals in criminal law, and the actions of the press.
While some parts of the book are less rich in this commentary, overall the
reader is left with the impression that the players in the system are generally
humble, qualified individuals, who empathize with those concerned about the
international judicial system.
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The authors rely on this impression to advance the second of their
goals-assuaging U.S. fears of international institutions. The authors are
honest about the relative lack of restraints on the courts, discussing, for
example, the WTO Appellate Body's writing of its own rules of procedure.
They note, "[u]nlike national judges, international judges do not inherit courts
of law; they need to build them" (p. 103), and admit that courts are being
disingenuous when they claim to merely "stat[e] the existing law" (p. 115).
They recommend recognizing and "harnessing" this lawmaking function to
ensure the best results (p. 130). Furthermore, one judge at least admits that the
purpose of judicial function is to "nudge" countries towards international
standards (p. 71). However, over time, growing uniformity of international
institutions and proliferation of precedent will increase formal restraint on
judges, as in the case of more established courts like the ICJ.
The argument that time will constrain international courts will hardly
placate the fears of those who are afraid of their freedom today. To combat
these concerns, the authors make two somewhat contradictory moves. First,
they argue that international judging is sui generis and cannot be evaluated by
the same criteria as national jurisprudence. International judges may have
more leeway because of the lack of formal legal guidance, but they are more
constrained by political pressure. Their institutions are more fragile, which
makes the judges more cautious. This is a weak argument; it is precisely the
sui generis nature of these courts that is at issue for critics, who claim that
their fragile nature would make judges subsume U.S. interests and justice to
the vicissitudes of political popularity.
The second move is rhetorical, and like most of the authors' rhetorical
moves, more effective than their arguments. The authors emphasize the
similarity of domestic (particularly U.S.) and international courts. Both
domestic and international judges are educated in similar settings: three of the
five profiled judges studied at Harvard Law School, and a fourth researched in
Washington D.C. (though a relatively small percentage of the judges on these
courts are alumni of U.S. law schools). Similarly, the authors' discussion of
the influence of political pressures on courts opens with the limitations of
judicial seclusion from politics both domestically and internationally. Finally,
most of the Foreword by Judge Sonia Sotomayor of the Second Circuit is
devoted to her identification with the experience of the international judge.
The authors conclude the book with arguments for supporting the
international legal system that have been made before, and better, by other
writers-the prevention of war, the promotion of human rights, and the need
for law as a substitute for power to aid the progress of poorer countries. The
strength of their overall argument remains in the rhetorical gloss they provide
the images of their judges. They emphasize the quality and education of the
judges. The challenges the judges overcome-we are told how judges had to
work in windowless rooms, or even in a bathhouse-show their commitment.
They are ultimately presented in a human, sympathetic manner. Of the five
judges profiled, one experienced apartheid in South Africa, one was a political
refugee from Chile, and one is a Holocaust survivor.
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The authors largely engage in storytelling from the perspective of judges
and court officials to make them appear familiar, sympathetic, responsible,
and unthreatening. Critics may find these methods lacking in substantive
argument. However, those who recognize the importance of international
standards of justice will welcome the persuasive methods used in the book to
overcome isolationist fears. Finally, the book teaches us that rather than
providing a heavy analysis to defend a position, sometimes a good story, well-
told, from someone in the know, can be persuasive.
Creating a World Without Poverty: Social Business and the Future of
Capitalism. By Muhammad Yunus, New York: PublicAffairs, 2008. Pp.
vii, 261. Price: $26.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Ronan Farrow.
In 1986, then-Governor of Arkansas Bill Clinton invited a little-known
Bangladeshi economist to Little Rock to help establish lending programs for
impoverished communities. Clinton had heard about Muhammad Yunus from
a college roommate of his wife, and followed how his bank had begun
empowering poverty-stricken Bangladeshis through the use of innovative
microloans. Within six years, Clinton had told Rolling Stone magazine that
Yunus "should be given a Nobel Prize." It was a refrain Clinton would repeat
often over the ensuing years, and before long, he wasn't alone in suggesting it.
Yunus's organization was the now-iconic Grameen Bank. Twenty years
later, when he finally did win the Nobel Peace Prize, Grameen had extended
loans to some seven million people with no other means of obtaining credit.
Newly anointed an international media darling in the wake of his 2006 Nobel
Prize win, Yunus is now turning his attention to the business world at large.
In Creating a World Without Poverty, he champions a tantalizingly
simple concept: a new category of businesses geared at addressing social ills,
functionally identical to traditional for-profit companies, but with one key
exception. Investors in what Yunus terms "social businesses" make back only
their investment, and any additional profit goes to expanding the business
itself. Freed of the obligation to maximize investors' returns, their sole bottom
line is improving the social impact of their operations.
The appeal of the social business concept is undeniable. Early in
Creating a World Without Poverty, Yunus provides a tediously obvious (but
convincing) laundry list of reasons why traditional catalysts of social progress
fail where his new model might succeed. Governments, he notes, are slowed
by the weight of their own bureaucracy and captive to the interests of the
wealthy by virtue of the political process. The same is often true for
multilateral economic institutions like the World Bank and the International
Finance Corporation (IFC), which also suffer from a fixation on large-scale
economic growth at the expense of small-scale development. Yunus reserves
particular disdain--or the closest approximation his relentlessly cheerful
delivery permits-for charities, which he deems wildly inefficient and
beholden to the ebb and flow of unreliable revenues. Yunus's social
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businesses would, by contrast, be self-sufficient, and retain the efficiency and
competitive incentives of for-profit companies.
Perhaps the most exciting thread that runs through Creating a World
Without Poverty is a fundamental critique of traditional business values.
Yunus's goal is nothing less than undermining the foundations of capitalism.
He proposes, with an optimism that would be mistaken for na'vet6 in anyone
with less ironclad credentials, that human beings are ultimately fulfilled by
factors other than profit, and that traditional capitalist values are, as a result,
outmoded. In one of his few moments of genuine eloquence, he subjects
mainstream economic wisdom to a withering invective:
Mainstream free-market theory suffers from a 'conceptualization failure,' a failure to
capture the essence of what it is to be human . . . . [W]e've created a one-dimensional
human being to play the role of business leader .... We've insulated him from the rest of
life, the religious, emotional, political, and social. He is dedicated to one mission only-
maximize profit. He is supported by other one-dimensional human beings who give him
their investment money to achieve that mission. To quote Oscar Wilde, "they know the
price of everything, and the value of nothing." (p. 18).
In Yunus's view, social business wouldn't just serve the needs of the poor-it
would fill a critical void for investors the world over. Investors in social
businesses would make back their money and, in the process, accrue other
benefits Yunus views as very tangible-an ownership stake in a movement
that has real impact and the fulfillment of a basic human need to help others.
It is both the single most important argument to Yunus's case, and the
hardest to swallow. Yunus genuinely believes in the idea of a thriving stock
market exclusively devoted to social businesses, championed by executives
who are judged by the amount of money they can pump back into the
operation of their social endeavors, not the wealth they accrue for
shareholders.
The challenge to this project, as it has been for microfinance, will be
proving that the answer lies in an innovative new idea rather than in fixing the
flaws of the old structures Yunus is so quick to dismiss. His ideas have
consistently attracted a host of naysayers. A vocal minority of economists
continues to decry microfinance as at best a misallocation of resources that
could fund larger scale businesses and produce more jobs, and at worst an
exploitative debt trap for the poor. Social business, an idea on an even grander
scale, will have a still harder road to acceptance. And though Yunus's abstract
ideas are robust, backed by genuine economic savvy, and acutely tuned to
potential criticisms, real world illustrations of the efficacy of social business
are limited.
As his most significant proof of concept, Yunus offers Danone-Grameen
Foods, a joint venture between his own institution and French dairy
powerhouse Danone. Yunus opens the book with a group of Danone
executives, over lunch at a French restaurant, committing in-full to a proposal
from the dumbstruck Yunus to begin a social business aimed at providing
affordable yogurt to malnourished children in Bangladesh. The plan was
simple: Danone would provide an initial investment and establish a
distribution network offering yogurt at prices affordable to the very poor.
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Three years into the life of the business, Danone would recoup its initial
investment, and from that point, continue pushing profit back into the
enterprise, expanding its reach and efficacy.
The concept remains unproven-Danone-Grameen is still in its infancy.
Yunus's romanticism about the revolutionary nature of the venture makes it
easy to forget that Danone's actual contribution-$500,000--represents a
minute investment for a business giant. But it's undeniably a significant
milestone, and in the years to come may be remembered as a forerunner of the
social business revolution Yunus is fighting for.
Yunus laces the book liberally with that lone example. Indeed,
repetition, perhaps an unavoidable consequence of his dogged polemicism, is
a problem throughout Creating a World Without Poverty. The entirety of
Yunus's argument is delivered with PowerPoint precision and occasionally
even bullet points in the book's first forty pages. The remainder of the text
rehashes material from Yunus's previous book-touches of his own
biography, a glowing rendition of the history of the Grameen Bank-before
closing with a giddily optimistic projection about the potential of social
business.
Yunus's case is done few favors by his workmanlike, matter-of-fact
prose, or his slightly irritating proclivity for acronyms (he insists early on that
he refer to conventional businesses as PMBs-Profit Maximizing
Businesses-then proceeds to do so ceaselessly). And for a book about the
plight of the poor-written by a man who justifiably claims to have spent a
lifetime "on the front lines" (p. 43) of poverty in his native Bangladesh-
Creating a World Without Poverty is surprisingly devoid of human drama.
Yunus's tirelessly chirpy and amiable worldview leaves room for barely a
mention of the realities of the tragedy he fights. Much space is devoted to
meetings with executives at fancy restaurants, while the personal stories of the
monolithic poor Yunus so often refers to are nowhere to be found.
Yunus's ideas are on such a grand scale, however, that it's hard not to be
won over. His obvious passion and the enormity of his undertaking are
enough to render inconsequential complaints about the book itself.
Muhammad Yunus is a visionary, and the potential his new ideas hold for real
change reads loud and clear on every page. Given his track record, and the
astute, finely honed set of guidelines with which he justifies his social
business model, it's difficult not to share his excitement.
Cultural Products and the World Trade Organization. By Tania Voon. New
York, NY. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Pp. xxxv,
306. $117.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Margot Kaminski.
Tania Voon's Cultural Products and the World Trade Organization is a
call for WTO members to address what she calls the "trade and culture"
problem. The conflict between trade liberalization and cultural protectionism
has already surfaced in several cases before the WTO Appellate Body, and
looks likely to arise again under the WTO's stalled Doha Round of
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negotiations. In this timely volume, Voon argues that the attempt to fit cultural
protectionism into the various exceptions to trade liberalization that the WTO
treaties provide has produced a "result that is unsatisfactory for all WTO
members" (p. 34). Her solution is to acknowledge cultural concerns by
allowing cultural subsidies, while otherwise standardizing and liberalizing
approaches to trade across WTO agreements. Unfortunately, Voon's solution
is neither wholly practicable nor visionary, leaving the reader with a work that
is detailed and informative, but yields unsatisfactory generalizations.
A former Legal Officer in the Appellate Body Secretariat of the WTO,
Voon decidedly supports trade liberalization. She recognizes, however, that
cultural protection could be a valid national goal, differing in kind from
discriminatory policies that merely favor domestic industry. This book is an
immensely thorough examination of what Voon calls "discriminatory cultural
policy" in light of the details of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994 (GATT 1994) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
(p. 43). Voon describes discriminatory cultural policy as aiming to bolster
national culture through the imposition of tariffs, quotas, or subsidies
supporting goods that are deemed "national," either through geographical
origin or through choice of language. Such measures have been imposed or
supported by Canada, France, Brazil, and Switzerland, among others, and
have generally been opposed by the United States and Japan-especially in
GATS negotiations.
The current wording of GATT 1994 and GATS provides no common
standard for handling cultural products in light of protectionist tendencies.
GATT 1994 forged multilateral commitments to national treatment, Most
Favored Nation (MFN) status, and market access. Article XX outlines the
only explicit exceptions to these commitments, including the protection of
public morals, health, national treasures, and exhaustible natural resources.
Although cultural protectionism might be argued to fall under some of these
categories (particularly the protection of national treasures and public
morality), this approach has not worked in cases before the WTO Appellate
Body. Therefore, there is no explicit exception for the protection of culture
under GATT 1994. Rather, cultural goods under GATT 1994 are meant to be
treated the same way as all other goods. The WTO Appellate Body affirmed
this conception in Canada-Periodicals, concluding that competing American
and Canadian publications were to be considered "like" products despite
potential cultural differences in content.
According to Voon, cultural products might merit some sort of
exception, although she does not advocate adding protection of culture to the
Article XX list. Voon does acknowledge that cultural products might be
particularly prone to market failure, since "sales of local cultural products in
the marketplace may not adequately reflect the cultural value of those
products to the wider community" (p. 33). This market failure justifies, in
Voon's view, a review of the approaches to cultural products articulated in
GATT 1994 and GATS.
The fundamental problem is that cultural products can be classified as
either goods or services and, depending on their classification, are subject to
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differing standards under GATT 1994 and GATS. GATS "imposes fewer
general disciplines and offers fewer general escape routes," while GATT 1994
imposes "exacting disciplines" on cultural products, with no special treatment
except for Article IV (a relic from GATT 1947 which allows countries to
impose "screen quotas" requiring a minimum number of domestic films to be
screened in commercial theaters) (p. 118). The discrepancy between GATT
1994 and GATS is one of Voon's most compelling arguments for revising
these agreements. Unlike her market failure argument, which can be
challenged according to varying ideas of the value and efficacy of national
paternalism, the discrepancy between the two WTO agreements clearly begs
for resolution in the near future.
Voon examines several options for revision of GATT 1994 and GATS,
both within the text of the agreements and in other bodies of international law.
WTO dispute settlement has not thus far allowed for exceptions due to the
cultural aspects of commercial products (as in the aforementioned Canada-
Periodicals case). International agreements external to the WTO, such as
UNESCO's 2003 Convention on the Protection of the Diversity of Cultural
Contents and Artistic Expressions or the UNIDROIT 1995 Convention on
Cultural Objects, also would not successfully overcome WTO regulations on
cultural products, as both are written to comply with preexisting treaties.
Voon thus returns to the text of GATT 1994 and GATS to make a three-prong
suggestion for revision of both agreements. She suggests that rather than
creating a new exception under GATT 1994, WTO Members should push for
recognition of digital cultural products as services under GATS. Also,
members should allow for an exception for discriminatory subsidies for
cultural products under GATS. Voon further supports increasing liberalization
under GATT 1994 by removing Article IV's allowance of screen quotas, or
revising it to apply to television and radio broadcasting as well.
This conclusion seems logically supported, and the book is well written.
The tone is evenhanded, avoiding the high versus low culture debate, while
still recognizing that culture is an issue that needs to be reckoned with in
trade. More importantly, Voon's work is very detailed, with background
information presumably gathered during her time at the WTO. Her intensely
thorough approach and deep knowledge of the tests applied to GATT 1994
language by the WTO Appellate Body render the book both scholarly and
practical.
The detailed nature of Voon's approach, however, leads to several
problems. While Voon declares that her conclusions are "not intended to be
practical suggestions to be implemented in the Doha Round of negotiations,"
her proposals are so detailed that they fail to be visionary (p. 247). She is so
focused on the restrictions imposed by existing structures that she rejects
nearly every proposal for reform as impracticable. Readers may find this
frustrating.
The biggest problem in Voon's argument is that she addresses GATT
1994 and GATS in somewhat of a vacuum. There is no discussion of the
negotiating agendas of different WTO parties, and even more troubling, there
is nearly no mention at all of intellectual property law. Any book that
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approaches WTO policy with regard to cultural products and spends only
three sentences addressing the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS) runs the risk of overlooking a broader set of
pertinent questions. After all, regulating cultural products is impossible if they
have not been declared to be uniformly accepted economic products at the
outset. Voon suggests that she has chosen not to discuss TRIPS because to
her, the agreement seems to facilitate cultural protectionism by monetizing or
incentivizing the creation of culture. This view, however, is not widely
accepted. In fact, from ongoing debates regarding the value of traditional
knowledge and geographical indicators in relation to trade and culture, it is
clear that intellectual property law is a prime locus for exactly the sort of
protectionism-versus-trade-liberalization debates Voon envisions.
Cultural Products and the World Trade Organization is thus a thorough
but also myopic approach to the issue of cultural products within current
international trade law. Voon's suggestions for reform are sensible, yet
somewhat disappointing in their lack of vision. One hopes that her extensive
research and knowledge might provide a backdrop for further study of this
important issue.
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